Jacob Goldstein
Jacob Goldstein spent more than a decade as co-host of the Planet Money podcast. He's also the author of the book Money: The True Story of a Made-Up Thing, which the New…
Gain access to ad-free versions of 20+ podcasts from the Pushkin library along with exclusive bonus episodes and other member benefits.
Depending on who you ask, Michael Milken was a greedy, unethical banker who grabbed all the money he could. Or he was a financial visionary who sparked the wave of financial growth and innovation that we’re still living in today.
This week, Jacob and Robert tell the story of how Michael Milken built the junk bond market, amassed wealth and power, then went to federal prison.
Research for this episode comes from:
Connect with us:
Robert Smith, today's show is about a financial visionary who nobly broke up the self-dealing club of insiders who turned America's economy into the sclerotic mess that was the 1970s. A man who helped create a new wave of economic growth.
00:16
Speaker 2
That we are still living in today. Finally, a hero's story.
00:19
Speaker 1
Today's show is also a story about a greedy, unethical banker who grabbed all the money he could and didn't care about the consequences. Robert Smith, do you see the twist coming?
00:27
Speaker 2
It's the same guy.
00:29
Speaker 1
It's Michael Milken. Ladies and gentlemen, today's show is about Michael Milken, a man who amassed money and power, who transformed the American economy, and then went to prison. It is a 40-year-old story that feels truly ripped from today's headlines. Just this week, I saw a headline on the Wall Street Journal homepage that said, a $ 300 billion debt wall is looming over private equity-backed companies. That is a Michael Milken-coded headline. I'm Jacob Goldstein.
00:59
Speaker 2
I'm Robert Smith. And this is Business History.
01:02
Speaker 1
It's a show about the history of business, a convenient way to describe the show if you would be so kind as to recommend it to your friends. If you're watching on YouTube, please subscribe. You can find us on TikTok and on Instagram at businesshistorypod. The year is 1970.
01:27
Speaker 2
Did they have middle names back then?
01:29
Speaker 1
They had middle names like Robert. Michael Robert Milken, newly minted Wharton MBA, went to work for a New York investment bank called Drexel. The bank would later become famous as Drexel Burnham Lambert. But in 1970, it became Drexel Firestone. And it received a capital infusion, yes, from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of Akron, Ohio.
01:53
Speaker 2
Firestone Tire and Rubber and Financial Engineering.
01:56
Speaker 1
Yes. And I mention this for a reason. And the reason is this. It tells you something about what the economy was like in America in 1970. It was still this old-fashioned industrial economy where companies in places like Akron, Ohio, were big enough and rich enough, and Wall Street banks were small enough and thinly capitalized enough that the tire company could put its name on the bank. Very different economy. To be fair, Drexel was like a third-tier bank. You know, it wasn't like Goldman Sachs was about to become.
02:32
Speaker 2
Goldman Sachs Nabisco.
02:33
Speaker 1
No.
02:34
Speaker 2
No.
02:35
Speaker 1
It was not going to be Goldman Sachs National Biscuit. So Milken gets a job at Drexel. Drexel's in New York. Milken's living in New Jersey. And at 5.30 every morning, Milken gets on the bus to work, the bus to Manhattan. And he brings with him a bunch of documents he needs to read for work, you know, SEC filings, annual reports, this sort of thing. And 5.30 in the morning, most of the year it's still dark out. And so Milken would wear a miner's headlamp so that he could sit there on the bus and read his documents.
03:07
Speaker 2
Because they wouldn't have those LED hikers lights. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
03:10
Speaker 1
A headlamp at this time was a real commitment.
03:12
Speaker 2
You're really committed. You had a big battery and you were reading financial documents all the way through the tunnel.
03:17
Speaker 1
And this is who Milken is. And a really striking thing about Milken is As he gets richer and more powerful, he only becomes more like this. When he's at his peak in the 80s, he's one of the most powerful men in finance. People all around the country want to talk to him. By that point, instead of getting on a bus at 5.30 a.m., he'll be getting to the office at 4.30 a.m. The man loves to work. And he is obsessed from an early age with With corporate bonds. From the time he was a college student at Berkeley in the 1960s. You go to Berkeley in the 60s, and what do you get obsessed with? Bonds.
04:00
Speaker 2
It's funny because even now, bonds are a little bit perhaps obscure to a lot of college students. And back in the 70s, how would you even get information or know anything about them?
04:10
Speaker 1
Yeah, in class. In class. In class at UC Berkeley. And in particular, he's interested in a particular kind of corporate bond. what we call today junk bonds because of Milken. At the time, they were called high-yield bonds because they had a higher yield. They paid more interest than regular bonds. So Robert Smith, master of business administration, give us A, very briefly, what is a bond? And B, all else equal, why would one bond pay more interest than another? Well, as we used to say on Planet Money, a bond is an IOU.
04:40
Speaker 2
It's a way to borrow money for a company to build, put out their products, factories, that sort of thing.
04:45
Speaker 1
It's a loan. It's a loan that people can trade.
04:48
Speaker 2
Number two, the reason why interest rates will be higher on some bonds than others is that the higher paying bonds are risky. And so if I'm going to lend money to a very risky company, I'm going to charge them a very high interest rate because they might not pay it back.
05:02
Speaker 1
So the higher interest rate is to account for the greater risk of default. Milken is interested in high yield bonds because when he was in college, he found these studies that had tracked bond returns from 1900 to 1965 and compared high yield bonds to what they call investment grade bonds, bonds that are essentially loans to safer companies and have a lower interest rate as a result. And what these studies found was, yes, unsurprisingly, the high yield bonds did have a higher default rate. There was a greater risk that the companies wouldn't pay the bonds back. But when you look at a basket, if you were to have bought lots and lots of bonds and You would have done better buying high yield bonds than buying safer bonds. In other words, the higher interest rate more than made up for the greater risk.
05:55
Speaker 2
And if you see something like that, you think all I have to do is do this at scale because I can make a little bit of money on people essentially mispricing these bonds. Yes. Yes.
06:04
Speaker 1
The bonds, the interest rate was too high is one way of thinking about it. And people knew about these studies, but nobody on Wall Street had really acted on it in a big kind of systemic way. For the most part, almost entirely, the bond market at this time was for investment grade companies. It was hard for companies with bad credit to get newly issued high yield bonds.
06:26
Speaker 2
And if you wanted to play this strategy, it wasn't like today you could just go on a computer and look for bonds that you can buy, there was no place to find the information about them. It was hard to get bonds. A lot of these companies weren't even borrowing money because they couldn't. Yes.
06:43
Speaker 1
And so there were some high-yield bonds they called fallen angels, which is a company with good credit issues bonds, and then the company sort of falls on hard times, and the bonds become high-yield bonds. So the bonds were angels, and now they're fallen angels. But really, at this time, Wall Street was not about this. Wall Street was... this club. In fact, the American economy was this club, right? This is the early 70s we're talking about now. And so if you think of the post-war American economy, the 50s and 60s, this is the very stable, clubby, country club, General Motors, AT & T.
07:24
Speaker 2
International business machines. Yes.
07:27
Speaker 1
Companies that have been around for generations. They're not entrepreneurial. Often they're in these sort of comfortable oligopolies, or in the case of AT & T, a monopoly. And it's a club. And Wall Street exists to serve this club. Wall Street is not there to underwrite bonds for sketchy companies that might go bankrupt or for upstart outsiders who want to challenge the club.
07:51
Speaker 2
You wanted the easy life of lending money to companies that were already making money.
07:56
Speaker 1
The status quo is working, and nobody is really aggressively challenging it. And then Milken comes along and gets a job as a trader at Drexel. And Milken is not a clubby kind of guy.
08:11
Speaker 2
You know why the headlamp looks bad when you're playing golf?
08:15
Speaker 1
Yeah, that's right. It's shining the headlamp in the guy's eyes. Three in the morning, putting, no. And Milken, a thing about him is he doesn't seem to care what anybody else thinks. Here is a quote from a book. called The Predator's Ball by Connie Bruck, one of the key sources for today's show. And this quote is another Drexel executive, somebody Milken worked with, describing Milken.
08:41
Speaker 2
Mike's difficulty, gigantic, was that he simply didn't have the patience to listen to another point of view. He would assume he had conquered the problem and go forward. He was useless in a committee, in any situation that called for a group decision. He only cared about bringing the truth. If Mike hadn't gone into the securities business, he could have led a religious revival movement.
09:05
Speaker 1
A thing I want to say here is, Milken did lead a revival movement, not exactly a religious movement, but a capitalist revival, a movement away from that old, stable, clubby economy and into this swashbuckling era of hostile takeovers and private equity.
09:24
Speaker 2
And keep this religious imagery in mind, because later on in the story, he is going to be preaching to large crowds of the faithful.
09:31
Speaker 1
Yes, at the Drexel High Yield Conference. It is the High Yield Bond Movement revival that he is leading. And the movement starts with Milken recruiting his apostles, his core followers. And these people are outsiders. They are people who are not in this club. They're hustlers. They've borrowed money. They've bought weird, you know, small insurance companies or banks. They're they're getting into finance at the margins. And Milken starts out preaching the gospel of high yield to these guys. This basic finding that if you buy a bunch of high yield bonds, you will outperform. And he gets some of these weird, you know, fallen angels and other, other weird high yield bonds that are out there at the time. And, uh, essentially sells them to these people who hold them and, in fact, start making a lot of money. This is, you know, getting into the 70s. This is working for them. And this is culturally different than the norm at the time. But one thing about Wall Street is if somebody is making a ton of money, then the culture will change. If there's a thing that's, like, not done and then somebody starts doing it and making money, they're like, oh, maybe that is a thing that is done. Yeah. With Milken's encouragement, some mutual fund companies start creating high yield bond funds. And so this means, you know, ordinary people can just buy this high yield mutual fund from, say, Fidelity or big asset managers. And then the fund manager will buy a bunch of high yield bond funds.
11:00
Speaker 2
And this is great for consumers because you can say, if I have my money, I can say, do I want it to be completely safe? Do I want it to go into IBM and make whatever it is at the time, 5%, 6%?
11:11
Speaker 1
Yeah, bonds, IBM bonds, yeah.
11:13
Speaker 2
Or do I want to, like, you know, get a huge return and take a chance?
11:18
Speaker 1
Yeah, or a somewhat higher return for a somewhat higher risk. It's also great for Michael Milken because what it creates is demand, sort of guaranteed pool of demand for these bonds. And he is at the center of the market. He's the one more than anybody else, who is finding the bonds, selling to these buyers, including the mutual funds. And crucially, there is not some stock exchange for this kind of bond. There is not, you know, anywhere where anyone who wants can find the price. These are bonds where people literally call each other and say like, hey, I've got these high-yield bonds. Do you want to buy some? And they negotiate the price over the phone. And so Milken effectively becomes the exchange for these bonds. He's the guy buying from sellers and selling to buyers. It's a very opaque market where people don't know what the price is. And the one guy who has all the information is Michael Milken. Robert Smith, Master of Business Administration. Why is it good to be Michael Milken in this setting?
12:24
Speaker 2
It's good to be Michael Milken in this setting because you can purchase a bond from somebody and immediately and opaquely raise the price of that bond and sell it to somebody else. And neither side really knows what went down in the transaction. So you could make one, two, three, four, five percent. Yeah.
12:46
Speaker 1
Milken is a market maker and there are market makers in all kinds of markets. On the stock market today, high frequency trading firms are market makers and they will make like a penny. You know, it's $ 100. 05, and then they turn around and sell it for $ 100. 06. So tiny fraction of a percent, and they just do it a ton of times.
13:05
Speaker 2
If you sell stock today, you're not necessarily selling it to some buyer. You're selling it to a market maker who will then turn it around and sell it when the buyer comes.
13:13
Speaker 1
A fraction of a second later, typically. So this market worked like that, but much more slowly and with a much bigger markup for Michael Milken. The bond market, especially at this time, was way more opaque than the stock market. And you might see market makers typically charge a spread, the difference between what they buy for and sell for, of something like 5%, which seems like a lot. But somebody who worked with Milken said Milken sometimes wanted to charge a markup of not 5%, not 10%, but 25%. Wow. Buy for 100 and then turn around and sell 10%. Soon after for $ 125.
13:53
Speaker 2
I picture him with two telephones, right? He's like, I'll buy it. And then in the other telephone, he's like, yeah.
14:02
Speaker 1
I'll give it to you for $ 125. By the way, that detail comes from Den of Thieves by James Stewart.
14:08
Speaker 2
James Stewart, legend. I shared an office with him at Columbia. Amazing.
14:12
Speaker 1
Have you read Den of Thieves? It's a very good book.
14:15
Speaker 2
I have.
14:16
Speaker 1
It's another one of the key sources for today's show.
14:17
Speaker 2
He's a very good writer.
14:18
Speaker 1
We'll hear a lot about it.
14:19
Speaker 2
In Act 3.
14:20
Speaker 1
So now Milken has his pool of buyers, his finance guys and his mutual funds. He's making a lot of money on the spread on his trade, but he's constrained by supply. He has a lot of demand. People want to buy these bonds, but there aren't that many of these bonds out there. Remember, it's the fallen angels. There aren't that many newly created high-yield bonds. And so in 1977— Michael Milken makes the move that will send him to infinity and beyond. He starts creating supply. He starts creating more junk bonds. In the language of Wall Street, Milken, Drexel, his firm, they start underwriting high-yield bonds, which just means they're creating new bonds for companies with bad credit. The companies want to borrow money. They go to Milken and Drexel. Drexel creates new bonds, places those bonds with investors, and the company gets the money.
15:19
Speaker 2
Is the company going to Milken or is Milken going to these companies? Is Milken going to small companies and being like, you know what you need? More money and bonds.
15:26
Speaker 1
First he goes to them and then they come to him.
15:28
Speaker 2
Yes.
15:29
Speaker 1
He starts in early 1977 with a $ 30 million bond issue for a Texas oil company. Texas oil company is one of your classic companies. High-yield borrowers, some former wildcat or something, by the end of the year.
15:44
Speaker 2
And you could see why you would demand high interest if you're loaning money to a bunch of guys in pickup trucks who may or may not find oil.
15:52
Speaker 1
Who are going out to drill holes in the ground, yes. Starts with that $ 30 million bond issue. Within the year, Drexel has underwritten junk bonds for seven different companies for a total of $ 125 million. And again, as with the higher spread... There are fees when a bank underwrites bonds. It's a service. Typically, those fees are around 1%. In this case, Drexel can charge more like 3% or 4%. So Milken has essentially created this new market, this new high-yield bond market. He has taken this third-tier bank that was named for a tire company and turned it into a major player. It's 1978. Milken is 31 years old, and he tells his boss that he wants to move his entire team from from New York all the way to California. Milken and his wife were from California. They wanted to be closer to family. But also, there is that phrase when you're in the satellite office far from headquarters, the mountains are high and the emperor is far away. When you get away from headquarters, you can kind of do what you want. You can build your own empire. And so you can imagine that being 3,000 miles away will let Milken really build his own empire. And this is not a normal thing in the 70s. You know, there's no video calls. There's no Slack. People aren't working remotely. They call Wall Street Wall Street because all the banks are in New York.
17:18
Speaker 2
But remember, Michael Milken didn't like work well in a group. He didn't like committees or meetings or any of this stuff.
17:24
Speaker 1
And Milken is making so much money that the firm sort of didn't have a choice. Give us give us a quote from from Milken's boss, how he described it later.
17:34
Speaker 2
What could we do? Mike was making 100% of the firm's profits.
17:39
Speaker 1
In a minute, Michael Milken moves to Los Angeles.
17:43
Speaker 2
Swim in pools, movie stars. We are back from the ads. Take us to sunny California, Jacob.
17:53
Speaker 1
Milken starts out in a skyscraper in LA, but a few years later, He moves the operation to the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and Rodeo Drive. Robert Smith, where is that?
18:04
Speaker 2
Beverly Hills. In fact, I believe I've gone by that intersection, and I believe there's a lot of jewelers right on that intersection.
18:11
Speaker 1
I think it's like the heart of Beverly Hills. Extremely expensive address. But inside Milken's office, the Drexel office there, is not particularly fancy. There's not a lot of decorations or nice furniture. What there is is this giant X-shaped desk. And the traders who work with Milken sit along the axes of the X. And Milken, of course, sits right near the intersection where the two arms of the X cross. And there's this quote from a banker in Connie Bruck's book about this.
18:44
Speaker 2
Mike sits in the middle of that X of the other desks so that he can see everyone. And then he screams and yells.
18:52
Speaker 1
I read this.
18:52
Speaker 2
I assume it's a small office. You're screaming and yelling just down the X.
18:56
Speaker 1
Sometimes I scream and yell at you and we're sitting right next to each other.
18:58
Speaker 2
True.
18:59
Speaker 1
I did wonder when I heard this, like maybe this is a guy who kind of wants Milken to look bad or whatever. So here for another point of view is a quote from Milken himself.
19:09
Speaker 2
I might overhear someone doing a trade that I don't think is a good idea. and might scream at them before they've completed that trade. So he's saying he's going to scream at them while they're on the phone with a customer.
19:21
Speaker 1
Don't do it! Don't do it!
19:23
Speaker 2
It's the wrong price!
19:24
Speaker 1
He probably wasn't quite that gentle. Milken was an intense guy. Around this time, he gave a description of a day in the life, a day in his life at work. And his whole day is like more than 12 hours. So don't do the whole thing. Just give me like a hit. Give me his morning.
19:41
Speaker 2
I come in the morning sometime between 4.30 and 5. I generally write notes for the people in the department, put them on an administrative person's chair by 5.15. she's put them on everyone's chair in the department. So if they're not in, they can't sit down without picking up the note. Nice move. Sometime around 10.45, 12.15, they put some food on my desk, which I eat in anywhere from one to five minutes. Really savoring.
20:06
Speaker 1
Go.
20:06
Speaker 2
Savoring the lunch. Pick, pick, pick, pick, pick.
20:09
Speaker 1
And I guess, you know, he has his assistant making calls for him all day. So I don't know if the one to five minute lunch is because he can't be on the phone while he's eating or he probably is on the phone while he's eating. He definitely had two phones at least. You know, he is that 80s finance guy.
20:24
Speaker 2
Spitting out pieces of his pastrami sandwich into the X.
20:28
Speaker 1
He is kind of becoming the finance guy by this point and starting, you know, in his Beverly Hills era to not just transform finance. and this is important, but the American economy more broadly. This is where his influence gets broader. And you can see it in a lot of different ways, but I want to pick one here, and that is Milken's relationship with a guy named Nelson Peltz. Nelson Peltz had dropped out of Wharton and joined his family's wholesale food business, but he wasn't content to just inherit the family business. He always wanted to be a player, you know, a rich, glamorous businessman. But he was frustrated. He wasn't getting where he wanted to be. And by the mid-' 80s, he and a business partner had recently bought a controlling stake in a cable company. But it wasn't a cable TV company, which was a booming business at the time. They made, like, metal cables. They also made wire and vending machines. It's a company called Triangle Industries, vending machine, wire, and metal cable company.
21:36
Speaker 2
They all work naturally together.
21:38
Speaker 1
And, you know, Nelson Peltz wants to be this big maher. And in the 80s, the way you do that, the way you become a big, powerful businessman, if what you've got is a vending machine company, is you do a leveraged buyout. You borrow a bunch of money, and you go and you buy a company. You do an LBO.
22:00
Speaker 2
So.
22:01
Speaker 1
Peltz borrows $ 75 million, actually from a bank that is not Drexel, because by this point, other banks are getting in on it. They see this as a great business. They see milk in its margins. Like this vending machine guy. It's going to be huge. Yeah, I mean, they don't even care if he's huge. We just got to charge him enough interest so that it works out for our basket of bonds. But for Peltz, $ 75 million is not enough. He needs to go bigger. So he goes back to that other bank and it's like, I need $ 100 million more. And they're like, no, we just loaned you $ 75 million or underwrote $ 75 million in bonds for you. And you're a vending machine company. We're not going to underwrite $ 100 million more. So he goes to Milken. And in 1984, Milken underwrites $ 100 million in bonds. And the bond issue, you know, bonds are typically... underwritten when a company wants to build a factory or release a new product. There's some very clear reason where we need this money now and we'll make more money later. In this instance, that $ 100 million in bonds was officially for possible future acquisitions and other corporate purposes. Who would buy these bonds? Well, they're charging 14% interest. I would buy these bonds.
23:13
Speaker 2
I would. 14%.
23:14
Speaker 1
I mean, come on. You know, anybody could borrow money if they pay a high enough interest rate. So Connie Bruck, the author, she actually asked Peltz if he was wary about borrowing $ 100 million plus that other $ 75 million when he didn't know exactly what he was going to do. You're borrowing all this money. You've got to pay all this interest. And Peltz thought, he just thought that question was ridiculous. Here's what he said.
23:39
Speaker 2
If I could have raised $ 400 million, I would have raised $ 400 million. Simple.
23:44
Speaker 1
You borrow all you can.
23:46
Speaker 2
It really is a different philosophy, one that seems normal today. Like, raise the money first, figure out what you're going to do with it later. But at the time, this was a little bit revolutionary that the desperate need of money to make more money is a bigger force than like, oh, we're building a new factory in Schenectady.
24:03
Speaker 1
Yeah, it's the shift to the financialized economy. It's the shift from, well, the Drexel Firestone tire and rubber and bank to finance driving much more of the economy. So now Nelson Peltz has all this money burning a hole in his pocket. He needs to deploy it because of that 14% interest rate. He's paying interest. He better, you know, he better do something with it. And in 1985, Peltz hears that Michael Milken is looking for a buyer for a company called National Can.
24:37
Speaker 2
National Can. We, of course, did a whole show about cans. The big player was American Can. American Can, 1901. Huge, huge, huge, huge. But National Can was a player, too. They came into the business.
24:50
Speaker 1
So by the 80s, National Can is a real company. They're making over a billion dollars a year in revenue, and they're a solid, stable, profitable company. And then what had happened was another buyout guy Milken worked with tried to buy a controlling stake. He failed. But once that happens, the company is in play, said to be in play. It's this kind of unstable equilibrium where it's clear that somebody is going to buy the company. And so Milken starts shopping it around. And he calls all these people who, if you have followed finance in the last 20 years, in this century, you know these names. He calls Carl Icahn and Sam Zell and Henry Kravis of KKR, the big private equity firm. These are guys who Milken was funding, essentially, who were getting big in this era, who are still with us today. None of them wanted to buy National Can.
25:42
Speaker 2
There's future in cans.
25:43
Speaker 1
And Nelson Peltz. It's like, Mike, Mike, ooh, ooh, pick me, pick me. He's not at the top of Milken's list. He's just this kind of little player, but he keeps pushing. Actually flew out to L.A., and here's what he said he told Milken.
26:00
Speaker 2
I want this deal. I don't want you to finance it for anyone else. I am not leaving until you agree.
26:06
Speaker 1
So finally Milken's like, all right, Nelson, okay, okay, you can have the deal.
26:10
Speaker 2
I gave you the money. Now I'm going to give you the deal.
26:13
Speaker 1
The trick is... The money he gave him, loaned him, underwrote, is not enough. So he had borrowed a total of $ 175 million. He didn't have all of that yet. He's going to need way more than that to buy National Can or to buy a controlling stake in National Can. And so Milken starts pulling the levers and pushing the buttons. And in all, he raises a round of $ 500 million for Nelson Peltz, this nobody's ever heard of who owns a vending machine company, to buy National Can.
26:47
Speaker 2
And imagine on Wall Street, everyone's like, well, wait a minute, if this guy can get $ 500 million and buy a national treasure of a company.
26:57
Speaker 1
Just wait. A year later, Milken raises another $ 560 million so that Peltz can buy the packaging business from Oh, it's the big can roll-up. It's the big can roll-up. He creates American National Can.
27:15
Speaker 2
Wow.
27:15
Speaker 1
American National Can. Dream come true. Two years after that, a big French company buys Triangle slash American National Can from Peltz and his partner. And Peltz personally makes something like $ 500 million on the deal. That is the amount that goes Into his pocket. And like, think about this. He wasn't some can genius. No. He didn't invent the stay tab opener.
27:44
Speaker 2
He didn't even have the money or the idea. It wasn't even his idea that somebody should buy a can company.
27:52
Speaker 1
All he had was... A vending machine company and a dream.
27:57
Speaker 2
And Moxie and Michael Milken behind him. And you can see at this point, everyone went, yes. Yes. All I have to do to make half a billion dollars is fly out to Beverly Hills, get a big pile of money, buy something, and then sell it again. I don't need ideas or charm.
28:17
Speaker 1
I just need Michael Milken to raise hundreds of millions of dollars for me.
28:23
Speaker 2
I feel like now is when we'd have a montage. They'd play the music and it's like Michael Milken just like dealing out, deal, deal, deal.
28:30
Speaker 1
And he is. There are a lot of people like Nelson Peltz. And to be clear, as we say, they don't all win, right? This game is the game of leverages. The game of borrowing money is you make a bet. And if it goes well for you, you make a ton of money. And if it doesn't go well, what leverage means is your company goes bankrupt. But whatever, it's not like we send you to debtor's prison.
28:51
Speaker 2
No, you just go to the back of the line at Michael Milken's office.
28:54
Speaker 1
And borrow again, if you can. So not everybody makes money. Some of them go bust. But a lot of people make money. And Milken becomes this central node in this newly emerging American economy. And you really see this at this annual conference that Milken holds. It's called the Drexel High Yield Conference. And it starts kind of in the early days, in the late 70s. And when it starts in the 70s, it is what you would expect. It's some bankers and some corporate guys sitting in conference rooms talking about bonds. But as the economy transforms, as Milken gets bigger, the conference grows, becomes more glamorous. And by the mid-80s, it is this major annual event. Robert, give us, actually, it's the very first paragraph of the book, Predator's Ball.
29:49
Speaker 2
In the third week of March 1985, the faithful, 1,500 strong, came to Beverly Hills to pay homage to Michael Milken. the legendary junk bond guru of Drexel Burnham Lambert, who many of his followers simply called the king.
30:05
Speaker 1
The king. Drexel booked all the rooms in the Beverly Hills Hotel for the conference. The hotel, by the way, was owned by Ivan Boski and his family. Boski is going to be a major player later in the story. The conference was held a mile away at the Beverly Hilton, started at 6 a.m. every day. It's late for Milken, early for everybody else.
30:26
Speaker 2
He's creating his own club here. He was never part of the clubby Wall Street, but this is his club.
30:31
Speaker 1
The club is coming to him. And there were meetings and talks all day, and there were parties at night that I guess got somewhat wild. The 80s, right? Rich people in the 80s. One client apparently asked for his room to have mirrors on the walls and ceiling, and Drexel paid for those to be installed. On the last night, there was a gala dinner when your Frank Sinatra was the surprise guest. Another year it was Diana Ross, who apparently didn't charge a fee but agreed to sing in exchange for being allowed to invest in one of Mike Milken's partnerships. That's when you really know you've made it.
31:06
Speaker 2
Wow.
31:06
Speaker 1
Frank Sinatra and Diana Ross were both recruited to the conference by Steve Wynn, the sort of giant businessman in modern Las Vegas who in some ways kind of made modern Las Vegas what it is. He was enabled by Wynn.
31:21
Speaker 2
Milken.
31:21
Speaker 1
Milken was the one who underwrote the bonds.
31:23
Speaker 2
And we've been looking into one or two Las Vegas shows.
31:27
Speaker 1
Yeah, we were talking about this and Steve Wynn, and we're like, oh, yeah, we should do a Vegas show.
31:30
Speaker 2
Yeah, between the mobsters and Steve Wynn. It's a great story.
31:33
Speaker 1
It's got to be a show there, yeah. And, of course, at the conference, the loyal faithful heard from the king. They heard from Michael Milken. Weirdly, there's not a lot of quotes from him, you know, direct quotes from his speeches. But here's one that I think sets things up well.
31:49
Speaker 2
The common perception is that capital is scarce, but in fact, capital is abundant. It is vision that is scarce.
31:56
Speaker 1
So first of all, abundant capital is one of the central interesting facts about the modern world. I mean, today, it's really apparent in the AI boom. You know, it has become a capital-centric boom, this incredibly capital-intensive project. And the fact that trillions of dollars have flowed into this thing is extraordinary. But we've seen it for decades now. It was the story of the housing boom and bust as well, for example. So, okay, capital is abundant, but vision is scarce. So what is the vision? What is the vision that Michael Milken is funding and that the people at the conference believe in? The vision fundamentally is that that club that has controlled the American economy for decades is bad at running the economy. that club has kind of run the economy into a ditch. And if you think about what was happening in the 70s when Milken was getting going, which is still kind of what we're coming out of in the 80s, the economy was bad. And of course, you know, there were the oil shocks and you can blame some of it on the oil shocks, but it wasn't all the oil shocks. I was looking back at the stock market, which is, you know, not the economy, but it's a measure of a lot of things. And not only did the stock market not go up very much in the 70s, in a way more interesting to me is, the P-E ratio, so the price to earnings ratio of stocks is actually really important. And it tells you basically how much do people think companies' profits are going to grow in the future. The higher the P-E, the more the expectation of profit growth. And today, the P-E of big companies in America, not just tech companies, but all of them on average is in like the high 20s.
33:38
Speaker 2
Meaning that you're expecting these companies to make a lot of.
33:40
Speaker 1
Money, to grow a lot, to make even more money in the future than today. That's higher than the long-term average. The long-term average is like oh, 15 or something, 18. In the 70s, people were so skeptical of American business that the average P.E. of big companies was like 8 or 10. It was incredibly low. So people had sort of given up on this idea that companies were going to grow.
34:05
Speaker 2
And we're seeing at this point Japanese car companies starting to import into the U.S., and exposing how slow-moving American car companies had become.
34:14
Speaker 1
And more generally, the 80s are the moment when Japan in general is buying up American assets. There is this sense that America is getting passed by, that Japan is better, basically.
34:26
Speaker 2
But not in Beverly Hills. This is not Michael Milken's sense. Right.
34:29
Speaker 1
So Michael Milken and his vision is My guys, these outsiders who Milken is funding, are going to take back control of American corporations. And this actually goes back to one of the oldest tensions in business. We've talked about it before on the show. It's the principal-agent problem, the separation of ownership and control. Because if you think about these companies at this time, you know, today— We're used to the biggest companies in the world. Many of them are run by the people who founded them. The entrepreneurs who started the companies are still running them. Think of Tesla or even Google. Those guys are still on the show.
35:09
Speaker 2
Meta.
35:10
Speaker 1
This was not true at the time. The big companies were run by managers. They'd been around for 100 years or so. The managers were in the club. They climbed the ranks.
35:19
Speaker 2
They were basically bureaucrats. We talked about this in the Warren Buffett show. Young Warren Buffett noticed that The boardrooms were filled with people who wanted to smoke cigars, eat fancy lunches, and go home early.
35:31
Speaker 1
So this is the club. And from Milken's point of view, from his people's point of view, this club is running the companies not to benefit the shareholders, not to maximize profits, but just to live their comfortable lives, pay themselves, maybe launch some vanity projects. Milken funds these corporate raiders. basically pirates sailing in with hundreds of millions of dollars of gold doubloons to buy the companies out from under those managers and whip them into shape. They called these hostile takeovers often because the CEOs and the boards didn't want to sell the companies. But the key thing is Milken's corporate raiders could never force the companies to sell because it's up to the owners. It's up to the shareholders. So it's not necessarily hostile to the shareholders. It's just hostile to the CEOs and the boards.
36:27
Speaker 2
To the middlemen.
36:28
Speaker 1
But the CEOs and the boards work for the shareholders. This, anyway, was the gospel according to Milken. This is one version of the story, and it is sort of true. It is true in some instances, but it is not entirely true. It is not the only version of the story. And this is why the Drexel High Yield Conference came to be known as the Predator's Ball. That wasn't what they called it at Drexel. That was what other people called it. And they called it the Predator's Ball because there was something predatory about these hostile takeovers. It wasn't just about making the companies more efficient. Oftentimes, sometimes, The raiders would come in, strip whatever assets they could, fire a lot of people, turn around, and as quickly as they could, resell the companies to the next guy to pocket a quick buck. A lot of people didn't like it.
37:22
Speaker 2
And they didn't like Michael Milken, more importantly.
37:25
Speaker 1
And a few years later, Michael Milken got indicted on federal charges. We'll talk about that in a minute.
37:33
Speaker 2
The King Falls. We're back from the break. We've seen Michael Milken at his high point. And now what? He's going to fall.
37:44
Speaker 1
Okay.
37:45
Speaker 2
Usually happens.
37:47
Speaker 1
Let's talk about Ivan Boski, a guy who is key to Milken's fall.
37:51
Speaker 2
Ivan Boski.
37:52
Speaker 1
Classic 80s finance guy. 200-acre estate in Westchester. Flew to Manhattan on a helicopter. Rode around the city in a stretch limo.
38:03
Speaker 2
You don't see stretch limos at all in the city anymore.
38:05
Speaker 1
It's the Escalade, right? It's all Escalades now.
38:07
Speaker 2
Boring.
38:08
Speaker 1
You know, the last time I saw somebody in a stretch limo was, did I ever tell you I was an extra on Saturday Night Live? No. Yes.
38:17
Speaker 2
When you were a kid?
38:18
Speaker 1
2003, 2004. No, I was like 30. I had just moved to New York. I knew a guy who, like, booked extras for the show. Guess who was the guest host when I? It was an extra.
38:29
Speaker 2
It was not Ivan Boski.
38:30
Speaker 1
It was Donald Trump. Oh, my. Are you kidding me? No, I'm not kidding.
38:33
Speaker 2
You've never told the story.
38:34
Speaker 1
I'm not on camera, unfortunately. There was a skit called Donald Trump's House of Wings. And I was one of the people sitting at tables at Donald Trump's House of Wings on stage. But I wasn't on camera. You can't actually see me. But it's true.
38:48
Speaker 2
I was there.
38:49
Speaker 1
And then afterwards, we're standing around outside. And Donald Trump pulls up, like, in the back of a stretch limo and leans out the window and yells to somebody who was on the show at the time. Was it Kenan Thompson? Was he on the show that long ago? I don't remember. And asks him if he wants a ride. And the guy says no, and Trump drives off.
39:08
Speaker 2
And from that moment on, no one drove a stretch limo in.
39:10
Speaker 1
New York City.
39:11
Speaker 2
That was it.
39:11
Speaker 1
That was the end of stretch limos. Where were we? Ivan Boski.
39:15
Speaker 2
Yes, he had a stretch limo.
39:17
Speaker 1
I want to talk about a commencement address that Ivan Boski gave in 1986. to the students graduating from the business school at UC Berkeley.
39:27
Speaker 2
Hippies.
39:29
Speaker 1
But it was the businesses. so they weren't. And the key part of the speech is quoted in that James Stewart book, Den of Thieves. And Stewart actually says this part seemed spontaneous and not scripted. So, Robert Smith, give us what Ivan Boesky told the graduates.
39:45
Speaker 2
Okay, Ivan Boesky pulls up in a stretch limo, addresses the graduates and says... Greed is all right, by the way. I want you to know that. I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself.
39:59
Speaker 1
Why did I pull this quote?
40:02
Speaker 2
Because this is going to become... The famous quote of the 1980s from the movie Wall Street, greed is good.
40:09
Speaker 1
Greed is good.
40:10
Speaker 2
Yeah.
40:11
Speaker 1
Gordon Gekko, Michael Douglas playing Gordon Gekko in Wall Street, gives the greed is good speech. One of the all-time famous finance moments in the movies.
40:21
Speaker 2
To be clear, Ivan Boski said you can be greedy and still feel good about yourself, which is different than greed is good.
40:28
Speaker 1
The first line is greed is all right, by the way. He also says greed is healthy. He says greed is good. Now, very interesting thing about the greed is good speech, which I had not listened back to in decades. I went and I listened back to it as I was putting this show together. You know what I did not remember at all? Michael Douglas slash Gordon Gekko starts the speech not by praising greed, but by complaining about the principal agent problem, complaining about the separation of ownership and control. So Here's the speech. He's in this fancy ballroom or something. There's executives sitting on this raised platform behind him. And Michael Douglas slash Gordon Gekko is holding the microphone and addressing the shareholders of a company called Teldar Paper. I want you to be Gordon Gekko. And I'm going to, in the middle, you'll hear from me. I'm going to be the CEO, Mr. Cromwell, of the company who's sitting behind Gordon Gekko. So, Gekko, you're addressing the shareholders.
41:31
Speaker 2
I got to feel it. I got to get my... My bow tie and my suspenders on. Okay. You own the company.
41:39
Speaker 1
That's right.
41:39
Speaker 2
You, the stockholder. And you are all being royally screwed over by these... These bureaucrats with their steak lunches, their hunting and fishing trips, their corporate jets and golden parachutes.
41:52
Speaker 1
This is an outrage. You're out of line, gecko.
41:55
Speaker 2
Teldar Paper, Mr.
41:56
Speaker 1
Cromwell.
41:57
Speaker 2
Teldar Paper has 33 different vice presidents, each earning over $ 200, 000 a year.
42:03
Speaker 1
$ 600, 000 in today's dollars.
42:04
Speaker 2
Now, I have spent the last two months analyzing what all these guys do, and I still can't figure it out.
42:11
Speaker 1
The crowd titters.
42:14
Speaker 2
Very, very interesting.
42:15
Speaker 1
Isn't that so interesting?
42:16
Speaker 2
Because you think greed is good is addressed to CEOs and bankers to justify what they're doing. But what he is saying is if you are a shareholder of the company, it is good that you want that company to make money. In fact, that's the only reason you bought the stock.
42:33
Speaker 1
And crucially, the case is that the CEOs are looting the company. These vice presidents who aren't doing anything are taking home a fat paycheck They're not making the world better. They're just taking money out of the company that they shouldn't.
42:50
Speaker 2
They're taking money out of the shareholders' pockets.
42:54
Speaker 1
So this is the Milken revival. This is the vision according to Milken being articulated in the movie. Now, we're going back to Ivan Boesky, the real-life Ivan Boesky. Worked with Milken a lot. Boesky was an arbitrageur.
43:11
Speaker 2
Ooh, French.
43:12
Speaker 1
French. Yeah, French. What it means is he bought stock in companies that were in play, companies that were maybe going to get acquired. And the play here is if the company gets acquired, its stock price will go up even more. Typically, the acquisition comes at a premium. But if the acquisition falls through, the stock price will fall. And so Boesky is making a bet generally that the acquisition is going to go through. And like any good finance guy, Boesky levered up. He borrowed a lot of money so that if he was right, he would make a ton of money. He, Boesky, raised $ 100 million from Milken via Milken in 83, another $ 660 million in 1986. James Stewart says Milken and Boesky talked on the phone several times a day. And if Milken didn't take Boesky's call, Boesky would just call back every two minutes, which I love. Give me Milken. Give me Milken. Maybe those two minutes was when Milken was eating his lunch. Now, think about Boesky's business, his speculation. He is betting that a proposed merger is going to go through. Who knows whether a proposed merger is going to go through? Investment bankers on Wall Street, the M & A bankers, the people who are doing these deals.
44:31
Speaker 2
And to be clear, when a merger is going to happen, those investment bankers are sworn to secrecy. You're not supposed to tell people, much less bet on stocks moving if you have inside information.
44:45
Speaker 1
But Boesky set up this insider trading ring. He was basically paying for information from investment bankers. And he got caught. He got caught and he agreed to cooperate with the feds. He flipped the.
44:58
Speaker 2
And he's an arbitrageur.
45:01
Speaker 1
He found an arb. And he led the feds to Michael Milken.
45:07
Speaker 2
Oh, his friend that he called every two minutes.
45:11
Speaker 1
In 1989, Michael Milken was indicted on 98 counts.
45:16
Speaker 2
Couldn't get to 100, could they?
45:17
Speaker 1
That included charges related to racketeering, securities fraud, insider trading, market manipulation. And a key piece of evidence in the case against Michael Milken was this $ 5. 3 million payment, a payment from Boesky to Drexel, to Milken, but to Drexel. And officially, it was for consulting and advisory services.
45:43
Speaker 2
Oh, dodgy.
45:45
Speaker 1
Prosecutors said it was to settle a balance for a series of secret illegal deals between Milken and Boesky. Basically, the allegation was that Milken was using Boski to manipulate the merger market, the acquisitions market. In one instance, Milken told Boski to buy a big stake in a company in order to help another Milken client take control of that company. There were other instances where Milken got Boski to buy stock when Milken wanted the price to go up. And the deal was, again, according to the Feds, according to the indictment, the deal was that Milken told Boesky that if Boesky lost money, Milken would pay him back, would make him whole. But if Boesky made money, then Milken and Boesky would split the profits. So this is a good deal for Boesky, right? No downside, all upside. It's a good deal for Milken because it allows him to, well, manipulate the market, allegedly.
46:45
Speaker 2
So if you're funding Boesky and you have this arrangement with him and Boesky's doing something that is illegal— then I guess what the feds are saying is that Milken, by having this deal with Boesky, is also doing something illegal.
46:57
Speaker 1
Well, directly, Milken getting Boesky to buy stocks on his behalf, on Milken's behalf, in order to manipulate the price, say, in a way that will benefit Milken and that Milken can't be seen to be doing directly, that is illegal, according to the feds. You know, if you're not allowed to trade in a stock, as Milken wasn't in some of these instances, you can't just go to somebody else and be like, hey, you trade in it for me and we'll make a financial deal to allow that to happen. That is illegal, according to the indictment. The 98 counts against Milken, by the way, weren't just Boeske-centric, but the Boeske stuff gives you a flavor. It was central to the indictment. In the end, Milken made a plea deal. He pleaded guilty to six counts, several of which came from his secret deals with Boesky. He agreed to pay something like $ 600 million in fines and restitution, some of which went to investors who had sued alleging losses due to Milken's schemes. And Milken was sentenced to 10 years in prison and permanently banned from the securities industry.
48:05
Speaker 2
Now, I remember in this case, that people who support Michael Milken say, well, you know, the feds went after his brother, his family. And so Michael Milken maybe admitted to things that he didn't necessarily believe in order to, you know, basically get the feds off his back.
48:23
Speaker 1
Yes. Yes. There is this whole essentially counter narrative about this case. And it is true that they indicted his brother who worked with him and that part of the plea deal was that they would drop the charges against the brother. There is this broader narrative that says the government only went after Milken so hard because he was going after the establishment. You know, this was payback to quote the title of a book that is sort of pro-Milken. And also, it is interesting that the prosecutor really driving the investigation for a long time was Rudy Giuliani, who clearly had political ambitions. And so you're going after this sort of public villain as a prosecutor. Also an outsider, also very ambitious. And then Milken gets out of prison after two years. He's banned from the securities industry. And he doesn't directly publicly promote this counter-narrative, but he does launch this new life as a philanthropist, basically. He starts these charities for prostate cancer research and melanoma research, has this think tank that actually has its own annual conference, but it's about big ideas. And so with the counter-narrative and the life as a philanthropist, this all sort of culminates in 2020 when Michael Milken was pardoned by President Trump. You know, I don't know. There's the narrative. There's the counter-narrative. I feel like for the story of Michael Milken himself, I guess I will leave it on this moment in 1990 when he pleaded guilty and he stood up in federal court. And here's part of what he said.
50:05
Speaker 2
I transgressed certain of the laws and regulations that govern our industry. I was wrong in doing so, and I knew that at the time. And I am pleading guilty to these offenses.
50:16
Speaker 1
So that's where we're going to leave the story of Michael Milken, the guy. But to finish the show, I want to talk about how the Michael Milken era lives on. So if you go back to Drexel, the company, Drexel, the company, also wound up pleading guilty itself to several felony charges and paid hundreds of millions of dollars in restitution. And the company wound up going bankrupt in 1990. But that same year, people who worked at Drexel, worked with Milken, left to start Apollo Global Management. If you follow finance today, you have heard of Apollo. They are this new kind of finance company. They have like a trillion dollars under management. And I don't mean that as an exaggeration. I mean, they have like a trillion dollars under management. And they do private equity and private lending, and they do a lot of work in this debt universe that we live in now. I started the show with a kind of ripped-from-the-headlines headline. I want to end the show on one more headline, ripped-from-the-headlines headline, a headline from just this week. We're recording the show at the end of October, 2026. This headline is about our man Nelson Peltz, who we last saw flipping— American National can, whatever, 40 years ago. The man is still in the game. Here's a headline. It's from Reuters. Shout out Reuters. And it's about Wendy's, the fast food chain.
51:42
Speaker 2
Wendy's gets $ 1. 4 billion take private offer from Peltz-led group.
51:48
Speaker 1
I can imagine Nelson Peltz being like, I want to buy your company for $ 1. 4 billion. And then the guy handed him his burgers out the drive-thru window. It's like, sir, this is a Wendy's. Email us at businesshistory at pushkin.fm. If you're mad that we weren't mad enough about Michael Milken, which would be reasonable.
52:10
Speaker 2
Write us an angry screed.
52:11
Speaker 1
Write us an angry letter. I'll write back as long as you're civil. Today's show was produced by Gabriel Hunter Chang. Our engineer is Sarah Bruguier. Our showrunner and editor is Jake Harper. Special thanks to Alex Nizam. I'm Jacob Goldstein.
52:27
Speaker 2
I'm Robert Smith. Thanks for listening.
Jacob Goldstein spent more than a decade as co-host of the Planet Money podcast. He's also the author of the book Money: The True Story of a Made-Up Thing, which the New…
Robert Smith, co-host of the Business History podcast, is a Professor of Journalism at Columbia University and contributing host of NPR's Planet Money where he tells stories about how the…